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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HAROLD BRITTAIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through UTAH DIVISION OF 
FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION AND 
MANAGEMENT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992), providing for jurisdiction in 
the Court of Appeals over cases transferred from the Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. In a lawsuit against the Utah Department of 
Employment Security and the Utah Division of Facilities 
Construction and Management, whether service of a notice of claim 
on the Division of Risk Management satisfies the statutory 
requirement that notice of a claim against the state be "filed 
with" the "agency concerned"? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of statutory 
construction, which is a question of law to be reviewed for 
Case No. 930416-CA 
Priority 15 
correctness, according no deference to the decision of the trial 
court. In re Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 
1991); Jerz v. Salt Lake County. 822 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether the State may be estopped from challenging 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court? 
Standard of Review: Whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. State Dep't of Social Services v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether the State's defense on the merits of 
plaintiff's claim should estop it from asserting plaintiff's 
failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement? 
Standard of Review: Whether undisputed facts establish 
estoppel is also a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness, without deference to the decision below. CECO Corp. 
v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989) 
(reviewing summary judgment). 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are set forth in full in 
Addendum B to this Brief: 
1903 Utah Laws 19 § 1 
1905 Utah Laws 5 § 1 
1965 Utah Laws 139 § 12 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 & -12 (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63A-4-101 to -103 (Supp. 1993) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63A-4-201(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) 
Utah Administrative Code R37-1-3 (1993) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Utah County, the Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
presiding, dismissing plaintiff's personal injury claim against 
the State for failure to comply with the statutory notice of 
claim requirement. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed his complaint in September 1991. 
Defendants answered in November 1991, denying all allegations 
material to this appeal and asserting as an affirmative defense 
that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act barred plaintiff's 
claims. In June 1992, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the ground that plaintiff had failed to file a notice of claim 
with the "agency concerned" as required by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. The trial court entered an order granting the 
motion on February 1, 1993. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 
on March 3, 1993. 
Statement of the Facts 
According to the allegations of the complaint, 
plaintiff was injured on February 4, 1991 when he slipped on some 
ice on the front steps of the Department of Employment Security 
(Job Service) building in Provo, Utah. Plaintiff alleged that 
snow had melted off the roof of the building and formed ice on 
the steps, that the Division of Facilities Construction and 
Management (DFCM) was negligent in approving the design and 
3 
construction of the building and roof, and that both DFCM and Job 
Service were negligent in maintaining the building and steps. R. 
1-4* 
The complaint contained no allegation that notice of 
plaintiff's claim was filed in accordance with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, In June 1992, the State moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to 
file notice of his claim with either Job Service or DFCM. R. 
117-34. 
In response to the State's motion, plaintiff submitted 
a copy of a notice of claim directed to the Attorney General and 
served upon both the Attorney General and the Division of Risk 
Management (Risk Management) on March 11, 1991. R. 167-72. 
Plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of his attorney, Brent D. 
Young, describing various correspondence and other contacts Mr. 
Young had before filing the complaint with an adjuster retained 
by Risk Management to investigate the claim, in which Mr. Young 
claimed that the adjuster identified himself as the "agent" of 
Risk Management and Job Service. R. 139-50. 
The trial court granted the State's motion on February 
1, 1993. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The term "agency concerned" in the notice of claim 
provision must be construed in light of the language of the 
entire provision and its statutory purpose. Construed in this 
light, the obvious and natural meaning of the term is the state 
4 
agency allegedly at fault for the claimant's injuries. To 
construe the term to refer to Risk Management or any other agent 
of the agency at fault is unreasonable. Brittain failed to file 
his notice of claim with either of the defendant state agencies 
and therefore his claim is barred. 
Brittain's contention that the State should be estopped 
from asserting his defective notice of claim is unsound for 
numerous reasons. First, failure to file a proper notice of 
claim deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of 
the claim and subject matter jurisdiction may not be established 
by estoppel. Second, Brittain's allegations do not establish any 
of the three elements of equitable estoppel: the State did not 
act or fail to act in any way inconsistent with its assertion of 
the defective notice of claim; any reliance on the State's 
conduct in defending itself on the merits was unreasonable; and, 
Brittain did not change his position in reliance on the State's 
conduct. 
For these reasons, the entire judgment below dismissing 
Brittain's complaint should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BRITTAIN'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE 
HE FAILED TO FILE NOTICE OF HIS 
CLAIM WITH THE STATE AGENCIES HE 
ALLEGED WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS 
INJURIES 
Brittain failed to file notice of his claim with the 
state agencies he alleged were responsible for his injuries and 
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therefore his claim is barred. Section 12 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 
(1989), provides: 
A claim against the state . . . is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned 
within one year after the claim arises. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989) (emphasis added.) Read in its 
full context and in light of the purpose of the statute, the term 
"agency concerned" unambiguously refers to the state agency 
allegedly at fault for the claimant's injuries. Brittain filed 
his complaint against Job Service and DFCM, alleging that their 
acts and omissions caused his injuries. Each of these agencies 
was therefore an "agency concerned" for purposes of Brittain's 
claim against the state and section 63-30-12 mandated that notice 
be filed with them. 
A. The "Agency Concerned" Is The State Agency 
Allegedly At Fault 
To interpret a statute, a court first examines its 
plain language. The court will resort to other methods of 
statutory interpretation only if the language is ambiguous. 
State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992). "A statute is 
ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons to have different meanings." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 
799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah. App. 1990). A statute is not ambiguous, 
however, simply because the parties urge differing 
interpretations. In re Estate of Ressencrer. 161 S.E. 2d 257, 260 
(W. Va. 1968). Cf. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 
1272, 1274-75 (Utah 1993) (construing insurance policy); Buehner 
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) 
(construing contract). 
As used in section 63-30-12, the term "agency 
concerned" cannot reasonably be understood by a well-informed 
person to refer to Risk Management. In determining whether a 
statute is ambiguous, its language is viewed in the context of 
the entire statute and according to the purpose of the 
legislation. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County. 568 P.2d 738, 
741 (Utah 1977) (construing statute according to its "natural and 
reasonable meaning . . . , consistent with its purpose"). In 
this context, the obvious and natural meaning of the term "agency 
concerned" is the agency allegedly at fault for the claimant's 
injuries. On the other hand, Brittain's interpretation of the 
term to mean Risk Management is forced and strained. See Mace v. 
Webb. 614 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980) (construing statute according 
to its "obvious and natural meaning."). £f. Buehner Block Co.. 
752 P.2d at 896 (applying same standard in construing contract). 
An examination of the language of section 63-30-12 as a 
whole reveals that in addition to filing with the agency 
concerned, the section explicitly requires that notice be filed 
with the Attorney General. As recently noted by the local 
federal district court, this dual notice requirement may at first 
blush appear redundant. See Kabwasa v. University of Utah. 785 
F. Supp. 1445, 1447 (D. Utah 1990) (dismissing pendant state 
claim for failure to file notice upon the University of Utah in 
addition to notice upon the Attorney General) (cited with 
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approval in Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 541 n. 
6 (Utah App. 1992)). 
The reason for this apparent redundancy is, however, 
easily discerned: each of the required filings serves a distinct 
purpose. The Attorney General has the duty to "defend all causes 
to which the state . . . is a party.11 Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 
(1986). Thus, notice to the Attorney General is obviously 
intended to ensure that the state's legal needs are met. 
On the other hand, as the Supreme Court recognized in 
Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977), the notice of 
claim requirement also "provides the governmental unit with an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and to remedy any defect 
immediately, before additional injury is caused . . . ." Id. at 
193. Neither the Attorney General nor Risk Management has the 
primary responsibility or authority to accomplish this loss 
control and prevention function. That responsibility and 
authority lies with the state agency allegedly responsible for 
the claimant's injuries, whose acts or omissions allegedly caused 
the injuries and against which the claim is asserted. Thus, a 
key purpose of the notice of claim requirement is fulfilled only 
by notice to the agency allegedly at fault. 
Brittain correctly notes that Risk Management has the 
authority to adjust, settle and pay claims within the coverage of 
the Risk Management Fund and thus serves some of the purposes of 
the notice of claim provision. Risk Management also assists 
state agencies in their loss control efforts by making 
8 
"recommendations aboi ' :isk management and risk reduction 
strategies 4 >•• • - - (Supp. 1993). 
Neverthe- __ 
upon Risk Management unreasonable. 
First, as Brittain notes, (formerly R26-' -,, jf 
the Utah Administrat: • tudf- p m v 
notice of cla iin the :overed entity" shal . • orward Risk 
Management, while ensuring that Risk Management w imately 
also receive notice of the cl ad m, f1 
contemplates that tr agency .egedly • eceive 
i • l' i • • i
 UIlfc5 c l a i m a n t . M o r e o v e r , ary 
provit-.,,-. exists for Risk Management to send copies n c 
receives covered entity :r;ck i Brittain's 
i .lbstantial 
risk i.:.a; notice I-J Risk Management would completely by-pass the 
agenc; v.-.-... herefore never alerted t . potentially 
< 
losses. 
Secon^ section 63-30-12 has required notice ir o the 
" i l l l l . ' IJC 'V V\ J'IMU f,J"l iH-M'11"" ,'l 1 llH I I l l l i M i l 
..965 Utah Laws 139 , Not: until 1981,,,, response 
decreasing availability and increasing cost of private 
i, n s u ;t; a n c v I' i < i o" ri- ,i t in rne 111:. ai II e ri t,i J I i e s v 'a M I<"' 11-i I', I" 4a na g ement c r ea t ed . 
Nor did any single state agency perform a comparable function 
before Risk Management was created. Thus, requirement 
I i 1 ,i, ihi'9 L I U L ,'u 'i';;." \ .I" I1! I lii I. il'i'ii iujc--i.h y I i in i c e r u e d " e 
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of Risk Management and was clearly not intended to refer to that 
agency. 
Third, if the legislature had intended, as Brittain 
asserts, that notices of claim be filed with Risk Management, it 
could have so provided simply by specifically naming that agency. 
The use of the generic term "agency concerned" rather than the 
particular agency name indicates that all state agencies are 
potential recipients of notices of claim, depending upon the 
particular claim being asserted. 
Brittain incorrectly asserts that "no other state 
agency is authorized to handle claims against state agencies," 
Brief of Appellant at 20. To the contrary, many claims that are 
subject to the notice requirement fall outside the coverage of 
the Risk Management Fund and thus remain the responsibility of 
the agency allegedly at fault. The Fund covers only those "risks 
as determined by the risk manager in consultation with the 
executive director." Utah Code Ann. § 63A-4-201 (1) (b) (Supp. 
1993) (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-1-47 (Supp. 
1992)). Thus, some claims against agencies otherwise covered by 
the Fund are not covered. (Claims for back wages in wrongful 
termination of employment cases, for example, are generally not 
covered.) 
In addition, the Risk Manager has the specific 
statutory authority to require or permit any state agency to 
self-insure or obtain separate private insurance coverage. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63A-4-103(1)(a) & (2)(a) (Supp. 1993) (formerly 
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codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-1- 46.1 (Supp. 1992)). Thus, some 
agencies Ifm p>xjinip I! i •, t In llniversit y nt III a h Hospd tal and 
College of Medicine) are covered by a separate self insurance 
fund not administered by Risk Management. 
Under this f I p * i h l «i • H \,a 1" uv i) i: y s c h e m i • r I  \P s c o p p o f 
coverage provided by t - Management Fund to state agencies 
historically has varied considerably while perhaps the 
large ma jo !| ' " daniages cla * aq^ncies arr 
covered by tne Fund, the overal <. . - nanagement scheme 
delegates to many different s*,vu agencies _..-J authority to 
hand] e c] a :i i:i is a gad list the state 
For claims that fall outside the coverage of the Risk 
Management Fund mperative that the agency allegedly at 
fau] t i: ecei i < _ a ::::] a:ii n i, t o 
Risk Management would not serve any of the purposes of section 
63-30-12. 
^. 
continually changing state risk management scheme may have 
considerable difficulty determining f -~ agency responsible for 
settlement • payment - . ei;(l suel! a \,u.\ x I , : i 
virtually always know or be able easily to determine which agency 
was responsible for the conduct that allegedly caused the 
T h u s , t. I 'i e oi J I. f reasonable interpretat ion of tlie t ei m ! ' agency 
concerned" is the state agency allegedly at fault. 
This conclusion reinforced by eading oi 
the relevant case Brittain is correct that the 
precise issue presented here is one of first impression, the 
meaning of "agency concerned" is nevertheless clearly divulged by 
the cases decided under section 63-30-12. 
In Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 541 
(Utah App. 1992), for example, this Court held that the 
plaintiff's claim against the state was barred because the 
plaintiff filed notice only with the Attorney General and not 
with the Utah Department of Transportation, the state defendant. 
In so holding, Court repeatedly stated that "[t]he plain language 
of section 60-30-12 requires notice both to the attorney general 
and UDOT . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the Court 
quoted approvingly from Kabwasa v. University of Utah. 785 F. 
Supp. 1445, 1446-47 (D. Utah 1990) in which the federal district 
court held the plaintiff's claims against the state barred 
because, again, the plaintiff there filed notice only with the 
Attorney General and not with the state agency named as a 
defendant. 
In Kabwasa, the court stated, "the plain meaning of 
section 63-30-12 requires that two notices of claim should have 
been filed by plaintiff: one to the Attorney General and one to 
the University of Utah." Ici. (emphasis added) . See also Johnson 
v. Utah State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1980) 
(holding notice of claim filed with the Attorney General and the 
defendant state agency within one year of the date the claim 
arose satisfied section 63-30-12 and was not nullified by filing 
of complaint on same day); Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218, 220-
12 
21 (Utah 1989) (J. Howe concurring and dissenting) (stating "Utah 
Code Ami, !! <>:\ Hi 1,:: (I'.HU., ti\i\;*\ -, .l/u-iu) icqulre^ l/hat .™LS a 
prerequisite to suing a state employee fc: -; • or omission 
occurring within the scope of his employmen • - plaintiff must 
w i,tih i in. one y e a r a 1 t.<. > r It: h e c ] a ::i iri a i 1.1 c e r 11; r"II HI i ni 
with the attorney general and with the agency employing the 
employee. (emphasis adder 
Resea, 
notice o" "• * Managemen \ ase, 
however, Risk Management • ^ - ' - -*-..-* -- defendant under - * recti 
action s Utah 
Code Ann Neel v. State. 213 Utah 43, 
44 (Utah App. May 21, 1993). 
These cases demonstrate th s 
meaning .: ' * he t:e;r: agency concerned" agency allegedl :-t 
addressing cue meanin - r 
an} these cases, respective c^i^s showed .. in 
applying the term according to its common sense meaning. 
Mo cases except Lamarr and Neel were 
decided before Brittair; accident In February 1991 and thus were 
available nyone attempting construe section 63-30 12 at 
)f el a i nil 
B. Notice Served Upon An Agent Of The "Agency 
Concerned" Is Invalid 
Thus, Brittain's theory that Risk Management itself is 
the "agency concerned" does withstand analysis or the 
r e a s o n s ci i s c u s s e d b t .• 1 o w Il n 11: 1a t 
notice served upon Risk Management satisfies the filing 
requirement of section 63-30-12 because Risk Management is an 
agent of Job Service and DFCM --is also unpersuasive. 
1. Strict Compliance With The Notice Of Claim 
Provision Is Required 
First, this latter contention amounts to an argument 
that substantial compliance satisfies the notice requirement. 
That argument has been rejected numerous times by the Supreme 
Court, which has consistently strictly construed the requirements 
of section 63-30-12. 
In Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist.. 531 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1975), for example, the Court held that the plaintiff's 
oral statements to the school principal who provided a written 
report to the school district did not satisfy Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-13 (1989), the parallel provision to section 63-30-12 for 
notices of claim against political subdivisions.1 
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that such actual 
notice sufficed, the Court stated, "We have consistently held 
that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the 
right to maintain a suit.11 Id. (citations omitted). See also 
Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977) (actual 
knowledge as evidenced by law enforcement officers' investigation 
of accident insufficient to satisfy notice requirement); Varoz v. 
Section 63-30-13 states: nA claim against a political 
subdivision . . . is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the governing body of the political subdivision within one year 
after the claim arises . . . .fl 
14 
Sevey, 2? " " 7.1 :r~. 5^~ r ~o *;". •:" ' ^x '~"-ex Compare 
Stahl . . .iah Transit Auth ••- :".:-l -- ^80) 
(Violo ;: .o ;,-.._. :.-.;•: ' •: '- i not ice 
requirement Public Transit Act, distinguishing the above 
cases on ground that sections 63-''• contain "words .i 
absolute prohibition a« ^  consequenc onip] :i ance, t] 3 
suggesting a stricter standard of adherence " ) . Under these 
cases, Brittain's failure tu JL.] e written notice with the 
appropriate state agencies i s fatal to his claim,. 
Brittain misconstrues several older Utah Supreme Court 
cases :i ii • i c '1 ::i n g c bso] ete notd ce prov i si ons as supporting a 
substantial compliance ^ . ^ . Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 
: * • - (Utah ";c- * -1 (affirming dismissal of complaint 
" - .ngham, i " i 
5891 22 i r a i > / r ; Spencer v. Salt Lake Cify 7 
Utah 2d * — reversing dismissal 
« I st; at ed general ly 
the nature of the alleged defect and the injury" but did not 
specify the amount " damages). 
) \ i III -.! 
that some leeway is accorded for content of ,^-b. 
Recent cases decided under sections r? n \ also grant a 
See Behrens v. Raleiah Hills Hosp.. Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 
(Utah 1983) (reversing denial of motion to amend complaint add 
allegations of misconduct); but see Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 
1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (affirming denial of motion to amend 
complaint to add malicious prosecution and false arrest claims 
where notice described only assault and battery). 
Brittain's reliance on such cases is misplaced. Unlike 
the plaintiffs in Spencer and Behrens. Brittain did not timely 
file notice on the appropriate parties in accordance with the 
statute. This case is more analogous to Sweet. Hurley. and, more 
recently, Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535 (Utah 
App. 1992) and Kabwasa v. University of Utah. 785 F. Supp. 1445 
(D. Utah 1990) , all of which dismissed of the plaintiffs' claims 
where no timely notice was filed on the proper parties. 
Brittain's attempt to distinguish Lamarr on the ground that in 
that case only one notice was filed is unpersuasive. Just as no 
notice was filed on the "agency concerned" in Lamarr. no such 
notice was filed here. The failure to file notice directly with 
the "agency concerned" is fatal to a claim against the State, 
regardless of how many other notices are filed. 
Again, this result is mandated by the language of 
section 63-30-12 itself. As noted by the federal district court 
in Kabwasa. 785 F. Supp. at 1447 (D. Utah 1990), "the Utah 
Attorney General is the agent and legal counsel for all state 
agencies . . . ." The requirement of filing with the agency 
allegedly at fault in addition to filing with its agent, implies 
that filing with an agent alone is insufficient and that the 
requirement of filing with the agency allegedly at fault has 
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particular importance. In other words, It 1.1 ling witl 1 an agent 
alone were sufficient, the statu ite would require only a single 
IjLjLXI1g wj_t|1 t h e attorney General. 
2. Risk Management Had No Actual Or Apparent 
Authority To Accept Brittain's Notice Of 
Claim 
Bri tifain * fi aqenry 1 hf-ory ^Jso fails under principles 
agency law, Therefore, even the ,: .-• luirement 
could be satisfied by service c: ' "~: ;.: an agent * the 
c lie: 
Assuming Risk Managemen, .^ , .;>- .:...-....:. vi>.er s+"3te 
agencies evertheless has r:<- authority either actusi r 
agency , Actual authority may be either express .mplied: 
Express authority exists whenever the 
principal directly states that its agent has 
the authority to perform a particular act on 
the principal's behalf. Implied authority, 
on the other hand# embraces authority to do 
those acts which are incidental to, or are 
necessary, usual and proper to accomplish or 
perform, the main authority expressly 
delegated to the agent. Implied authority is 
actual authority based upon the premise that 
whenever the performance of certain business 
is confided to an agent, such authority 
carries with it by implication authority to 
do collateral acts which are the natural and 
ordinary incidents of the main act or 
business authorized. This authority may *,^  
implied from [sic] the words and conduct of 
the parties and the facts and circumstances 
attending the transaction in question. 
Zions First Nat1! Bank v Clan k clinic Corj, , 
1094-95 (Utah 1988) (footnotes omitted). 
Brittain has identified no express statement of the 
J. / 
authority of Risk Management by either Job Service or DFCM. The 
duties and powers of the Risk Manager, however, are defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63A-4-101 and -102 (Supp. 1993). See Addendum 
B. Neither of those provisions contain any express statement 
that the Risk Manager has authority to receive notices of claim 
for other state agencies. See Addendum B. 
Nor is such authority implied by those provisions. As 
discussed in Point I.A. above, the Risk Management Fund provides 
only limited coverage for state agencies and the notice of claim 
serves an important function performed primarily by the agency 
allegedly at fault. As also discussed in Point I.A. above, the 
administrative rules promulgated by the Risk Manager provide that 
the covered entity shall receive notices of claim and forward 
copies to Risk Management while no corresponding provision exists 
for Risk Management to send copies to the covered entity. Utah 
Administrative Code R37-1-3 (1993). Thus, the facts and 
circumstances here undermine, rather than support the notion that 
Risk Management has actual authority to receive notices of claim 
for other state agencies. 
In contrast to actual authority, apparent authority "is 
premised upon the [principal's] knowledge of and acquiescence in 
the conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely upon 
the agent's actions.11 Risk Management had no apparent authority 
to accept notices of claim on behalf of either Job Service or 
DFCM. 
"An agent's apparent or ostensible authority flows only 
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from the acts and conduct of the principal." Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d at 1095. 
Nor is the authority of the agent "apparent" 
merely because it looks so to the person with 
whom he deals. It is the principal who must 
cause third parties to believe that the agent 
is clothed with apparent authority . . . . 
It follows that one who deals exclusively 
with an agent has the responsibility to 
ascertain that agent's authority despite the 
agent's representations. 
City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth. 672 P.2d 89, 90 
(Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
Here, for his claim that Risk Management was acting as 
agent for the defendant state agencies in accepting his notice of 
claim, Brittain offered the affidavit of Mr. Young concerning a 
series of letters and other contacts between Mr. Young and either 
Risk Management or a private insurance adjuster. R. 139-50 
(attached as Addendum C). None of these letters or contacts, 
however, evidence any representations made directly by either Job 
Service or DFCM. (In fact, DFCM was not even mentioned in any of 
the correspondence. In addition, most of the contacts occurred 
after Brittain had served his notice upon Risk Management on 
March 11, 1991, and therefore Brittain cannot claim to have 
relied upon them in deciding to send his notice to Risk 
Management.) 
The only representation made or action taken directly 
by either Job Service or DFCM at any time within the year after 
the accident, was when Job Service "reported the claim to State 
Risk Management." R. 150 (Affidavit of Brent D. Young, K 3). 
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While this may have been sufficient to clothe Risk Management 
with apparent authority to act as Job Service's agent, that 
authority was not unlimited. In reporting the claim to Risk 
Management, Job Service did not contradict the plain mandate of 
section 63-30-12 that a notice of claim be filed with the agency 
concerned, i.e. the agency allegedly at fault. Thus, Risk 
Management did not have apparent authority to accept a notice of 
claim on behalf of either Job Service or DFCM. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation 
in Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980). In Forsyth, 
some buyers under a real estate purchase contract sent the seller 
a letter dated September 28 requesting a deferral of payments 
until the spring. They were then contacted by the seller's 
attorney, who granted the buyers a grace period. While upholding 
the trial court's finding that the attorney had apparent 
authority to act as the seller's agent, the Court continued: 
[W]e are compelled to note that the agency 
was not unlimited, that is, Mr. Skeen was 
acting as agent for Mrs. Pendleton to respond 
to plaintiff's letter and only within the 
scope of that letter. Accordingly, we 
believe that any grace granted by him could 
not be greater than that actually bestowed 
upon him by Mrs. Pendleton, of which there is 
no evidence, nor any greater than that which 
he apparently had. In light of the contents 
of the September 28 letter and its repeated 
and specific reference to renewing the 
payment schedule when spring came, this Court 
is unable to agree with plaintiff that Mr. 
Skeen had unlimited authority to waive 
payments indefinitely. 
Id. at 361. 
Just as the buyers' letter to the seller in Forsyth 
20 
defined and limited the apparent authority of the attorney to 
respond for the seller, the relevant statutes here define and 
limit the apparent authority of Risk Management to receive a 
notice of claim. As discussed in Point I.A. above, section 63-
30-12 requires that notices of claim be filed with the agency 
allegedly at fault. Absent any specific evidence that Risk 
Management was granted authority to receive the notice of claim 
in this case, Risk Management's apparent authority cannot extend 
beyond that granted under section 63-30-12. In reporting 
Brittain's informal claim to Risk Management, Job Service did 
nothing inconsistent with statutory scheme that contemplated 
filing of formal notice of the claim with Job Service and DFCM. 
Thus, neither defendant state agency engaged in any act 
or conduct suggesting that Risk Management had authority to 
accept a notice of claim. Brittain does not claim that either 
Job Service of DFCM had knowledge of and acquiesced in the 
service of his notice of claim upon Risk Management. Therefore, 
Risk Management had no authority, either actual or apparent, to 
accept Brittain's notice of claim. Brittain's claim is therefore 
barred by section 63-30-12. 
POINT II 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION MAY NOT 
BE CONFERRED BY ESTOPPEL 
Brittain's contention that the State should be estopped 
from asserting his defective notice of claim is unsound as a 
matter of law. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
unequivocally held that compliance with the notice of claim 
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requirement is jurisdictional and that failure to comply deprives 
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff's claims. 
In Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535 (Utah 
App. 1992), this Court addressed the issue, raised by UDOT for 
the first time on appeal, of whether the plaintiff's notice of 
claim was defective because it was filed only with the Attorney 
General and not with UDOT. The plaintiff contended that UDOT had 
waived any defect in the notice by failing to raise the issue in 
its answer or in its successful summary judgment motion. This 
Court rejected that contention: 
Lamarr's argument, however, misconstrues the 
nature of the statutory notice of claim 
requirement. Lamarr erroneously asserts the 
notice of claim provision is a statute of 
limitation. Rather, the supreme court has 
held the statutory notice requirement is a 
jurisdictional requirement and a precondition 
to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 
245, 250 (Utah 1988). 
Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at 
any time by any party or the court. 
Therefore, Lamarr's contention that the 
notice issue is not properly before this 
court fails. In fact, Rule 12(h)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires this 
court to dismiss the claim against UDOT if 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction. 
Id. at 540 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The court 
went on to affirm the trial court's dismissal of Lamarr's 
complaint on the ground that the notice of claim was defective. 
Id. at 541-42. 
As this Court has noted, to hold that a party may be 
estopped from asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
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"seems inconsistent with the generally announced and fundamental 
legal proposition that ' [s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the 
authority and competency of the court to decide the case,' 
without which, the court may not validly act." Van der Stappen 
v. Van der Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335, 1339 n. 5 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting State v. Viiil. 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). 
Based on that inconsistency, this Court questioned the 
apparent holding of Caffal v. Caffal, 5 Utah 2d 407, 303 P.2d 
286, 288 (1956), that a husband was estopped from attacking the 
validity of a divorce decree on the ground that the marriage was 
void and therefore the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. Van der Stappen, 815 P.2d at 1339-40 nn.5 & 8. 
See also Nelson v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co.. 143 N.W.2d 
289, 296 (Iowa 1966) ("Jurisdiction of a court over the subject 
matter is conferred by law and cannot be based on the estoppel of 
a party to deny its existence."); In Re Estate of Edinger. 136 
N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1965) ("'Jurisdiction of the subject matter 
is derived solely from law and can, in no event, be conferred by 
the consent of the parties,' waiver or estoppel." (citations 
omitted)); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 95 at 455 (1965 & Supp. 1992) 
("It is generally settled that there can be no valid waiver of an 
objection that a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, and that there can be no estoppel to object on this 
ground."). 
The court in Van der Stappen went on to suggest that 
the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Caffal that the trial court 
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a marriage where the 
marriage was void was erroneous because the court could have 
entered a decree of annulment. Van der Stappen. 815 P.2d at 
1339-40 n.8. Nevertheless, because the parties had "based their 
arguments upon the premise that Caffal's statement regarding 
subject matter jurisdiction is controlling," and because "we do 
not have the power to overrule a decision of the supreme court," 
the Court in Van der Stappen applied Caffal. "[I]t appears that 
at this time we can do no more than question Caffall. The 
problems we see with Caffall will remain unresolved until dealt 
with by the supreme court." Van der Stappen, 815 P.2d at 1339-40 
n.8. 
More troublesome here is the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989). In 
Forsman. the Court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's 
claim against the State and remanded the case to the trial court 
for determination of an issue of fact as to whether the State 
should be estopped from asserting the plaintiff's defective 
notice of claim as a defense. Id. at 220. 
The Court's decision in Forsman hinged upon Rice v. 
Granite Sch. Dist.. 23 Utah 2d 22# 456 P.2d 159 (1969), in which 
the Court had held a school district was estopped from asserting 
the plaintiff's failure to meet the applicable statute of 
limitations. In relying on Rice, however, the Forsman court 
failed to consider the critical distinction between the notice of 
claim requirement, which is jurisdictional, and a statute of 
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limitations, which may be waived. Thus, the Court erred. 
To follow Forsman here would not only perpetuate that 
error and further confuse the law on this issue, but would be 
inconsistent with Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247-50 (Utah 
1988) followed in Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 541, in which the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the failure to file notice of a claim is 
jurisdictional. It would also be inconsistent with the numerous 
Utah Supreme Court cases which hold that parties may not waive, 
consent to, or acquiesce in the improper exercise of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.. A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland 
Constr. Co.. 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991); Olson v. Salt Lake 
City Sch. Dist.. 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). 
While this Court may be powerless to overrule a 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court, when faced with conflicting 
lines of cases, neither of which even mentions the other, this 
Court must choose between them. Consistent with the general rule 
that subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred by 
estoppel, this Court should reject Brittain's contention that the 
State is estopped from asserting his defective notice of claim. 
POINT III 
THE STATE'S DEFENSE AGAINST 
BRITTAIN#S CLAIM ON THE MERITS DOES 
NOT ESTOP IT FROM RAISING THE 
DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
The State's investigation of and defense against 
Brittain's claim on the merits do not estop it from raising the 
defective notice of claim. "Estoppel is '"conduct by one party 
which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course 
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of action resulting in detriment or damages if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate his conduct."'" Mont Trucking, Inc. v. 
Entrada Indus., Inc.. 802 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citation omitted). "'To find estoppel, three elements must be 
present: (1) a representation, act, or omission, (2) justifiable 
reliance, and (3) a change of position to one's detriment based 
on that reliance.'" Id. (citation omitted). Brittain has shown 
none of these three elements. 
First, the State has made no representations and 
committed no acts or omissions inconsistent with its assertion of 
the defective notice of claim. The State's investigation of and 
defense against Brittain's claim on the merits were not 
inconsistent with its assertion of the defective notice of claim. 
The State has no duty to inform claimants of defects in 
their notices of claim. As Brittain points out in his brief, 
around the turn of this century, the statutory notice requirement 
for claims against municipalities expressly required 
municipalities to give claimants notice of any defects in their 
notices and allow sufficient time to cure the defect. 1903 Utah 
Laws 19 § 1; Bowman v. Oaden City. 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561, 564 
(1908). This provision was later amended to delete the language 
requiring that municipalities give claimants' notice of such 
defects. 1905 Utah Laws 5 § 1. As recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court, that amendment was "no doubt intended" to 
eliminate the opportunity to cure defective notices. Sweet v. 
Salt Lake City. 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167, 1171 (1913). 
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The legislative choice not to impose upon governmental 
entities the duty to give claimants' notice of defects in their 
notices of claim was repeated in the enactment of section 63-30-
12. It was Brittain's obligation to strictly comply with the 
plain requirements of section 63-30-12 and the State had no duty 
whatsoever to alert Brittain to any and all possible defects in 
his notice of claim. 
Moreover, at least two and one-half months before the 
one year period ran for filing notice of Brittain's claim, the 
State filed an answer raising the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
as a defense. The State's tenth affirmative defense stated: 
Defendants are immune or this action is 
barred by virtue of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § Fsicl 63-30-1. 
et seq.. including without limitation, § 
[sic] 63-30-3, -4, and -10. 
R. 19 (emphasis added). While not specifically identifying the 
notice of claim provision, this defense put Brittain on notice of 
a potential bar to his claim. Had he been interested in this 
defense to his claim, Brittain could have conducted discovery to 
determine its factual basis. The State would then have been 
forced to disclose the defect in Brittain's notice. Only eleven 
days after the State's answer was filed, however, instead of 
conducting such discovery, Brittain filed a Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial. R. 23. 
Second, even if the State's investigation of and 
defense against Brittain's claim on the merits could be viewed as 
inconsistent with its later express assertion that Brittain had 
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failed to file proper notice of him claim, Brittain did not 
justifiably rely on the State's conduct, Brittain has vigorously 
advocated the validity of his notice of claim in response to the 
State's motion to dismiss and on this appeal. That advocacy 
itself shows that in investigating and defending against 
Brittain's claim on the merits, the State merely took legitimate 
and necessary steps to protect its own interests. As Brittain 
points out, this case presents an issue of first impression of 
the interpretation of section 63-30-12. While the State strongly 
disagrees with Brittain's interpretation of that provision, 
certainly neither Risk Management nor the Attorney General's 
office could properly fulfill their duties by assuming that the 
notice of claim would ultimately be found invalid. 
That Risk Management and the Attorney General's Office 
had a duty to defend the defendant state agencies against 
Brittain's claim on the merits was presumably understood by 
Brittain's counsel. The Utah Supreme Court resoundingly rejected 
a similar estoppel argument where the plaintiffs were represented 
by counsel when the acts on which they allegedly relied occurred. 
Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). 
In Cornwall, the plaintiffs had timely filed a proper 
notice of claim, but failed to file their complaint within one 
year after the claim was deemed denied as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-15. They contended that the defendant county should 
be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense 
because "an insurance adjuster for the county lulled them into a 
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false sense of security by requesting medical information 
regarding the physical condition of the minor appellant." 
Cornwall, 571 P.2d at 926. In so contending, the plaintiffs 
relied upon Rice. 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), which "held 
that a lay person might be so deceived by the conduct of an 
insurance adjuster as to create an estoppel on the part of the 
school district from raising the matter of late filing of the 
complaint." 571 P.2d at 927. 
Addressing this argument, the Court stated: 
The instant matter differs from the Rice 
case. There the plaintiff was not 
represented by counsel and late filing was 
alleged to be excusable by the actions and 
conduct of the adjuster which gave rise to a 
genuine issue of material fact to be 
determined by the trial court. In the 
present case, the plaintiff had counsel who 
had timely filed the claim and who was well 
acquainted with the statute which provided 
that a complaint must be filed within one 
year after a claim is denied. The actions of 
the adjuster under those circumstances were 
not such as would warrant a conclusion that 
the clear mandate of the statute need not be 
followed. 
571 P.2d at 927. This holding silently adopted the reasoning of 
the dissent in Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 522 P.2d 1252, 
1254 (Utah 1974), impliedly overruling that decision. 
Like the plaintiff in Cornwall. Brittain was 
represented by counsel who could not reasonably have 
misinterpreted the State's conduct. Thus, Brittain did not 
justifiably rely upon the State's conduct in investigating and 
defending against Brittain's claims. 
Third, Brittain did not change his position in reliance 
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on the State's conduct. Brittain filed his notice of claim on 
March 11, 1991. According to his own allegations, Brittain then 
had only one preliminary contact with Risk Management which 
occurred on February 27# 1991. R. 149-50 (Affidavit of Brent D. 
Young, K 4). Thus, Brittain did not change his position in 
reliance upon the subsequent investigation of his claim by Risk 
Management or upon the defense against his claim by the Attorney 
General's Office. 
In sum, none of the three elements of equitable 
estoppel are present here. The State made no representation to 
Brittain that his notice of claim was valid. Brittain did not 
justifiably rely upon the State's conduct in investigating or 
defending against his claim on the merits. Nor did Brittain file 
his notice with the incorrect agency in reliance on that conduct. 
Thus, the State was not estopped from moving to dismiss 
Brittain's complaint based upon his defective notice of claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The common sense meaning of the term "agency concerned" 
as used in the notice of claim provision is the state agency 
allegedly at fault. Brittain's construction of the term to refer 
to Risk Management is unreasonable. Brittain failed to file his 
notice of claim with either of the agencies he alleges are 
responsible for his injuries and therefore his claim is barred. 
The State may not be estopped from asserting the 
defective notice of claim because failure to file a proper notice 
of claim deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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Subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred by estoppel. 
Moreover, this case does not present any of the three elements of 
an equitable estoppel claim. 
This Court should therefore affirm the entire judgment 
of dismissal below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2() ^aay of August, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DEBRA &S MOORE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES were mailed, postage prepaid, 
this Z^day of August, 1993, to: 
Brent D. Young 
Ivie & Young 
48 No. University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
JAN GRAHAM - (1231) 
Attorney General 
EDWARD 0. OGILVIE - 2452 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD BRITTAIN, 
: ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
Plaintiff, : PREJUDICE 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF • Civil No. 910400628PI 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, AKA : 
JOB SERVICE, AND UTAH : Judge Lynn W. Davis 
DIVISION OF FACILITIES : 
CONSTRUCTION AND : 
MANAGEMENT, : 
Defendants. : 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came up for hearing on 
December 23, 1992, Edward 0. Ogilvie, appearing for defendants 
and Brent D. Young, appearing for plaintiff. Based on the 
accompanying memorandums in support of Defendants' Motion, and 
for good cause appearing, the Court finds that plaintiff failed 
to comply with the statutory Notice of Claim requirements found 
within Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1953), requiring that notices 
of claim be filed with, the Utah Department of Employment 
Security and the Utah Division of Facilities and Construction 
t 
r*' 
Management, the defendant state agencies. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' cause of 
action against defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice, 
DATED this / day of / ^ ^ 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved As To Form: 
*l#fih W. Davis 
Fourth District Court Judge 
\ 
V 
\ \ 
Brent D. Young 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE to the following this^TV day of vN^y\o^v o 1993. 
* 
Brent D. Young 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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OP, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT'lN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD BRITTAIN, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, et al, 
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PROCEEDINGS. 
THE COURT: I normally would not rule 
from the bench respecting a case of this 
magnitude where the briefing has been as 
complex, and as long and this detailed. 
But I do think that strict compliance is 
required. I think anything short of that frankly 
flies in the face of well-established case law, 
whether it's Richards, or Madsen or Scarborough. 
There's a long list of cases that have been 
relied upon by the State of Utah. 
I've noted--and the simple question 
presented is that whether filing a Notice of 
Claim with Risk Management is deemed notice to 
the agency concerned under the statute. That's 
the narrow issue, very narrow focus in this 
case. 
The facts involved are that the plaintiff 
alleges is injured on February the 4th, 1991,--
Is that the accurate date? 
MR. OGELVIE: I think that's correct. 
Yes, Your Honor, at least I have it down that 
way. 
THE COURT: As a result of slipping on 
ice on the steps of the Utah Department of 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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Employment Securities Building. 
As a result of these alleged injuries, 
plaintiff claims that defendant agency was 
negligent. And then plaintiff, pursuant to the 
provisions in 63-30-11, filed a Notice of Claim 
with the Utah Attorney General's Office, but did 
not file a Notice of Claim to the Utah 
Department of Employment Security. Rather, 
plaintiff filed the second notice with Risk 
Management, which is the State's self insurance 
agency. 
Defendant then asserts that the filing of a 
Notice of Claim with Risk Management is 
defective and has not noticed-- quote, unquote--
the agency concerned, under 63-30-11(2) and (3). 
That states, for the record, in pertinent 
part, paragraph two: " Any person having a 
claim for injury against a governmental entity 
shall file a written Notice of Claim with the 
entity before maintaining an action. " 
Paragraph 3-B reads: " Notice of claim 
shall be directed and delivered to the 
responsible government entity according to the 
requirements of 63-30-12 or 63-3-13." 
63-30-12 provides, in relevant part: " A 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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claim against the State or against its employee 
for an act or omission is barred unless Notice 
of Claim is filed with the Attorney General and 
the agency concerned within one year after the 
claim arises . " 
The notice provision is simply 
jurisdictional. Under Lamar V U,D,O.T,, failure 
to comply with the notice provision can be 
raised at any time in proceedings, as pointed 
out by counsel both in his brief and also in 
argument today. 
If the Court finds that the plaintiff did 
not comply with the notice provision, then it 
must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
The statute's meaning is plain on its 
face. The language in question-- quote, 
unquote--" agency concerned" is clearly meant 
to be the governmental agency which was 
responsible for the injury. In this case it 
would have been the Utah Department of 
Employment Security. They were not served with a 
Notice of Claim as required by law. 
As a result, the Court must dismiss this 
case for lack of jurisdiction. Strict compliance 
is required. That's how I read all of the cases 
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involved. There's no dispute that the Utah 
Department of Employment Security was not 
served, and I think the claim is clearly barred. 
I think the case law is also clear in this 
case. The reliance upon Richards-- the Richards 
case, or the Madsen case, or the Scarborough 
case. I think those are-- it's good law. 
Whether we agree with it or not or whether it 
seems to be fair is not at issue. There is no 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
I don't believe there's any ambiguity in 
the-- in the language of the agency involved. 
Risk management is no more the agency involved 
than an insurance company that represents a home 
owner where an accident has occurred. 
The estoppel argument I find to be weak. 
Certainly it does not--cannot create 
jurisdiction. It does not concur jurisdiction. I 
don't find in this case any misrepresentation on 
the part of the State of Utah, any fraud on the 
part of the State of Utah, or any representation 
that there would be an acceptance of service of 
process by Risk Management or that they 
otherwise were an agent under these 
circumstances. 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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Jurisdiction is never waived. The case law 
is controlling. I'll grant the State's Motion to 
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Counsel, if you will prepare an order 
consistent with the ruling today that relies 
chiefly upon the reasoning in your brief. 
MR. OGELVIE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Anything further in this 
case? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor. 
Could the order recite verbatim what the 
Court has found on the record? 
THE COURT: Well, you may secure a 
copy if you wish, counsel. Normally my orders do 
not recite verbatim rulings that I make in open 
court. We sometimes misspeak. We're prone to be 
redundant. Orders made in open Court orally 
often do not flow in terms of syntax, etcetera. 
MR. YOUNG: This one seemed to. 
MR. OGELVIE: Your Honor, I just 
simply take the position-- if the Court is in 
agreement-- that I'll prepare the order and 
indicate what the Court stated that it relied 
on-- the reasoning and authority cited in the 
brief, the memorandum which we filed in support 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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of the motion, which I think--
THE COURT: I've drawn from some 
notes, counsel, as I have looked at both of the 
briefs. If you believe that that would be 
helpful, I'll provide a copy to both counsel. 
But I've expanded beyond those notes, based upon 
the arguments that were presented today. 
We'll be in recess. Thank you very much. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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ADDENDUM B 
1903 UTAH LAWS 19 SECTION 1 
CHAPTER 19. 
CLAIMS AGAINS? INCORPORATED CITIES AND TOWNS. 
AH ACT tmecdirg lectkr.s 313 ard 3x3 of the Revised Statutes cf Utah, 1898, in relation to claims against incorpor-
ated cities and towns. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
V 
SECTION 1. That sections 312 and 313 of the Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1898, be, and the same are herebj- amended to read as 
S.L. 1903, e " l 9 l l O W S : 
IS p!(2d) 259 312. Presentation of claim, time for action. All claims against a 
city or town for damages or injury alleged to have arisen from the 
defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of any street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such city or town, or 
from the negligence of the city or town authorities in respect to any 
such street,alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall, with-
in ninety days after the happening of such injur}' or damage, be pre-
sented to the city council of such city or board of trustees of such 
town, in writing, signed by the claimant or by some authorized 
person, and properly verified, describing the time, place, cause and 
extent of the damage or injury; and no action shall be maintained 
against any city or town as aforesaid, for injuries to person or pro-
perty, unless it appears that the claim for which the action was 
brought was presented to the council as aforesaid, and that the 
council or board did not, within ninety days thereafter, audit and 
allow the same. Every other claim against the city or town must 
be presented to the city council or board of trustees, as the case may 
be, within one year after the last item of the account or claim ac-
crued. Such claims .must be verified, as to their correctness, by the 
claimant or his authorized agent. If the city council or board of 
trustees shall refuse to hear or consider a claim because not prop-
erly made out, notice thereof shall be given the claimant, and suf-
ficient time allowed him to have the claim properly itemized or veri-
fied. 
313. Claims barred if not presented. I t shall be a sufficient bar 
and answer to any action or proceeding against a city or town, in 
any court, for the collection of an}' claim mentioned in section 312, 
that such claim had not been presented to the city council of such 
city, or to the board of trustees of such town, in the manner and 
'within the time in section 312 specified. 
1905 UTAH LAWS 5 SECTION 1 
CHAPTER 5. 
TIME FOR FILING CLAIMS AGAINST INCORPORATED CITIES AND TOWNS. 
An Act amending Sections 312 and 313 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, as amended 
by chapter 19 of the laws of Utah, 1903, defining the time within which claims against 
incorporated cities and towns must be filed. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
SECTION. 1. That sections 312 and 313 of the Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1898, as amended by chapter 19 of the laws of Utah of 1903, be, 
and the same hereby are amended to read as follows: 
312. Claim, time for presenting. Action on. Every claim against 
an incorporated city or town for damages or injury alleged to have 
been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition 
of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such 
city or town, or from the negligence of the city or town authorities in 
respect to any such street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, or bridge 
shall within thirty days after the happening of such injury or damage, 
be presented to the City Council of such city, or Board of Trustees 
of such town, in writing signed by the claimant or by some person by 
claimant authorized to sign the same, and properly verified, stating 
the particular time at which the injury happened, and designating and 
describing the particular place in which it occurred, and also particu-
larly describing the cause and circumstances of the said injury or 
damages, and stating, if known to claimant, the name of the person, 
firm or corporation, who created, brought about or maintained the 
defect, obstruction or condition causing such accident or injury, and 
also stating the nature and probable extent of such injury and the 
amount of damages claimed on account of the same; such notice shall 
be sufficient in the particulars above specified to enable the officers 
of such city or town to find the place and cause of such injury from 
the description thereof given in the notice itself without extraneous in-
quiry, and no action shall be maintained against any city or town for 
damages or injury to person or property, unless it appears that the 
claim for which the action was brought was presented as aforesaid to 
the City Council or the Board of Trustees of the town, and that such 
Council or Board did not within ninety days thereafter audit and allow 
the same. Every claim, other than claims above mentioned against any 
city or town must be presented properly itemized or described and veri-
fied as to correctness by claimant or his agent,to the City Council or Board 
of Trustees within one year after the last item of such account or claim 
accrued, and if such account or claim is not properly or sufficiently 
itemized, or described or verified, the City Council or Board of Trus-
tees may require the same to be made more specific as to the itemization 
or description, or to be corrected as to the verification thereof. 
1965 UTAH LAWS 139 SECTION 12 
Section 12. One-Year Limitation on Actions Against State. 
A claim against the state or any agency thereof as defined herein 
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attor-
ney general of the state of Utah and the agency concerned within one 
year after the cause of action arises. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 63-30-11 AND 12 (1989) 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability, 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim 
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be 
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises, 
the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 63A-4-101 t o 103 (SUPP. 1993) 
PART 1 
RISK MANAGER 
63A-4-101. Risk manager — Appointment — Duties. 
(1) The executive director shall appoint a risk manager, who shall be quali-
fied by education and experience in the management of general property and 
casualty insurance. 
(2) The risk manager shall: 
(a) acquire and administer all property, casualty insurance, and 
workers' compensation insurance purchased by the state; 
(b) recommend that the executive director make rules: 
(i) prescribing reasonable and objective underwriting and risk con-
trol standards for state agencies; 
(ii) prescribing the risks to be covered by the Risk Management 
Fund and the extent to which these risks will be covered; 
(iii) prescribing the properties, risks, deductibles, and amount 
limits eligible for payment out of the fund; 
(iv) prescribing procedures for making claims and proof of loss; and 
(v) establishing procedures for the resolution of disputes relating 
to coverage or claims, which may include binding arbitration. 
(c) implement a risk management and loss prevention program for 
state agencies for the purpose of reducing risks, accidents, and losses to 
assist state officers and employees in fulfilling their responsibilities for 
risk control and safety; 
(d) coordinate and cooperate with any state agency having responsibil-
ity to manage and protect state properties, including the state fire mar-
shal, the director of the Division of Facilities Construction and Manage-
ment, the Department of Public Safety, and institutions of higher educa-
tion; 
(e) maintain records necessary to fulfill the requirements of this sec-
tion; 
(f) present an annual report to the executive director describing the 
execution of risk management responsibilities in the state; 
(g) manage the fund in accordance with economically and actuarially 
sound principles to produce adequate reserves for the payment of contin-
gencies, including unpaid and unreported claims, and may purchase any 
insurance or reinsurance considered necessary to accomplish this objec-
tive; and 
(h) inform the agency's governing body and the governor when any 
agency fails or refuses to comply with reasonable risk control recommen-
dations made by the risk manager. 
(3) Before the effective date of any rule, the risk manager shall provide a 
copy of the rule to each agency affected by it. 
History: C. 1953, 63-1-45, enacted by L. safety" for "which shall include but not be lim-
1981, ch. 257, § 1; 1990, ch. 97, § 1; renum- ited to examination of records, on-site inspec-
bered by L. 1993, ch. 212, § 69. tions, and education programs" at the end 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- thereof; redesignated former Subsection (4) as 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the Subsection (2)(d); deleted "but not limited to" 
subsection designation "(1)" at the beginning
 afUr deluding" and inserted "the Division of 
of the section; designated former Subsections ^fore "facilities" in Subsection (2)(d); redesig-
(1) and (2) as Subsections (2)(a and (2Kb); in-
 n a t e d f o r m e r Subsections (5) and (6) as Subsec 
serted and workers compensation insurance ^ons (2)(e) and (2X0; added Subsections (2)(g), 
in present Subsection (2)(a); added Subsections ,ovu\ J /o\ _ J L J «. v *• u 
(2><b)(i) to (2)(b)(v); redesignated former Sub- « £ > • ?*(3); a " d m f d V J M ° , n foo , 
section (3) as Subsection (2XO and substituted ^ 1993 amendment, effective May 3 1993, 
"to assist state officers and employees in fulfill- " n ^ r e d Uus section, which formerly ap-
ing their responsibilities for risk control and Pe8"*1 M * 63-1-45. 
63A-4-102. Risk manager — Powers. 
(1) The risk manager may: 
(a) enter into contracts; 
(b) purchase insurance; 
(c) adjust, settle, and pay claims; 
(d) pay expenses and costs; 
(e) study the risks of all state, agencies and properties; 
(f) issue certificates of coverage to state agencies for any risks covered 
by Risk Management Fund; 
(g) make recommendations about risk management and risk reduction 
strategies to state agencies; 
(h) in consultation with the attorney general, prescribe insurance and 
liability provisions to be included in all state contracts; 
(i) review agency building construction, major remodeling plans, 
agency program plans, and make recommendations to the agency about 
needed changes to address risk considerations; 
(j) attend agency planning and management meetings when necessary; 
(k) review any proposed legislation and communicate with legislators 
and legislative committees about the liability or risk management issues 
connected with any legislation; and 
(1) solicit any needed information about agency plans, agency pro-
grams, or agency risks necessary to perform his responsibilities under 
this part. 
(2) (a) The risk manager may expend monies from the Risk Management 
Fund to procure and provide coverage to all state agencies and their 
indemnified employees, except those agencies or employees specifically 
exempted by statute. 
(b) The risk manager shall apportion the costs of that coverage accord-
ing to the requirements of this part. 
History: C. 1953, 63-1-46, enacted by L. sections (4) and (5) as present Subsections 
1981, ch. 257, § 1; 1981, ch. 250, § 1; 1990, Q)(c) and (l)(d); deleted former Subsection (6), 
ch. 97, § 2; renumbered by L. 1993, ch. 212, relating to the prescribing of risks to be cov-
§ 70. ered by the fund; redesignated former Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- tions (7) and (8) as present Subsections (l)(e) 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the and (1 )(f); added Subsections (1 Kg) to (1)0) and 
subsection designation (1) at the beginning of
 ( 2 ) ; a n d m a d e stylistic changes, 
the section; redesignated former Subsections
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1) and (2) as Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb);, de-
 r e n u m b e r e d ^ ^ ^ w h i c h f o r m e r l 
leted former Subsection (3), relating to adop- - ^ - - ^ J
 fiB g M , -
 J r 
tion of regulations; redesignated former Sub- I***"1 M * w*1*4t>-
63A-4-103. Risk management — Duties of state agencies. 
(1) (a) Unless specifically authorized by statute to do so, a state agency 
may not: 
(i) purchase insurance or self-fund any risk unless authorized by 
the risk manager; or 
(ii) procure or provide liability insurance for the state, 
(b) (i) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection (a), the State 
Board of Regents may authorize higher education institutions to pur-
chase insurance for, or self-fund, risks associated with their programs 
and activities that are not covered through the risk manager. 
(ii) The State Board of Regents shall provide copies of those pur-
chased policies to the risk manager. 
(iii) The State Board of Regents shall ensure that the state is 
named as additional insured on any of those policies. 
(2) Each state agency shall: 
(a) comply with reasonable risk related recommendations made by the 
risk manager; 
(b) participate in risk management training activities conducted or 
sponsored by the risk manager; 
(c) include the insurance and liability provisions prescribed by the risk 
manager in all state contracts, together with a statement certifying to the 
other party to the contract that the insurance and liability provisions in 
the contract are those prescribed by the risk manager; 
(d) at each principal design stage, provide written notice to the risk 
manager that construction and major remodeling plans relating to agency 
buildings and facilities to be covered by the fund are available for review, 
for risk control purposes, and make them available to the risk manager 
for his review and recommendations; and 
(e) cooperate fully with requests from the risk manager for agency 
planning, program, or risk related information, and allow the risk man-
ager to attend agency planning and management meetings. 
(3) Failure to include in the contract the provisions required by Subsection 
(2)(c) does not make the contract unenforceable by the state. 
History: C. 1953, 63-1-46.1, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 97, § 3; renumbered by L. 1993, 
ch. 212, § 71. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, renumbered this 
section, which formerly appeared as § 63-1-
46.1, and made stylistic changes in Subsection 
(1). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 97 be-
came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. — State Board of Re-
gents, establishment, powers and authority, 
§ 53B-1-103. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 63A-4-201 (1) (b) (SUPP. 1993) 
PART 2 
RISK MANAGEMENT FUND 
63A-4-201. Risk Management Fund created — Administra-
tion — Use. 
(1) (a) There is created the Risk Management Fund, which shall be admin-
istered by the risk manager. 
(b) The fund shall cover property, liability, fidelity, and other risks as 
determined by the risk manager in consultation with the executive direc-
tor. 
(2) The risk manager may only use the fund to pay: 
(a) insurance or reinsurance premiums; 
(b) costs of administering the fund; 
(c) loss adjustment expenses; 
(d) risk control and related educational and training expenses; and 
(e) loss costs which at the time of loss were eligible for payment under 
rules previously issued by the executive director under the authority of 
Section 63A-4-101. 
(3) In addition to any monies appropriated to the fund by the Legislature, 
the risk manager shall deposit with the state treasurer for credit to the fund: 
(a) any insured loss or loss expenses paid by insurance or reinsurance 
companies; 
(b) the gross amount of all premiums and surcharges received under 
Section 63A-4-202; 
(c) the net refunds from cancelled insurance policies necessary to self-
insure previously insured risks, with the balance of the proceeds to be 
refunded to the previously insured agencies; 
(d) all refunds, returns, or dividends from insurance carriers not specif-
ically covered in Subsections (3)(a), (b), and (c); 
(e) savings from amounts otherwise appropriated for participation in 
the fund; and 
(f) all net proceeds from sale of salvage and subrogation recoveries 
from adverse parties related to losses paid out of the fund. 
(4) All monies deposited in the fund are nonlapsing. 
(5) (a) Pending disbursement, the risk manager shall provide surplus mon-
ies in the fund to the state treasurer for investment as provided in Title 
51, Chapter 7, State Money Management Act. 
(b) The state treasurer shall deposit all interest earned on invested 
fund monies into the fund. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-92, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 250, § 2; 1983, ch. 129, § 1; 1983, 
ch. 307, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 108; 1990, ch. 97, 
§ 4; C. 1953, § 63-1-47; renumbered by L. 
1993, ch. 212, § 72. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the 
first and second sentences of Subsection (1) as 
Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b); rewrote Subsec-
tion (2), which read T h e fund shall be used 
solely for the payment of insurance or reinsur-
ance premiums, costs of administering the 
fund, loss adjustment expenses, and loss costs 
which at the time of loss were eligible for pay-
ment under rules previously issued by the risk 
manager"; deleted former Subsection (4), relat-
ing to rules promulgated by the risk manager; 
redesignated former Subsection (5) and (6) as 
Subsections (4) and (5); deleted former Subsec-
tion (7), relating to management of the fund by 
the risk manager; deleted former Subsection 
(8), relating to restrictions on the purchase of 
insurance by any agency except as authorized 
by the risk manager or the State Board of Re-
gents; and made stylistic changes. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
renumbered this section, which formerly ap-
peared as § 63-1-47; deleted "of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services" after "execu-
tive director" in Subsections (1Kb) and (2)(e); 
substituted "63A-4-101" for "63-1-45" in Sub-
section (2)(e) and "63A-4-202" for "63-1-48" in 
Subsection (3)(b); and made a stylistic change 
in Subsection (5)(a). 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R37-1-3 (1993) 
R37-1-3. 
A. In the event of an "occurrence" or "personal in-
jury" as defined in coverages issued by the Fund, or of 
an act, error, omission or any other situation likely to 
give rise to a claim covered by the Fund, a covered 
entity shall give notice to the Fund, including reason-
ably obtainable information regarding the event, as 
soon as practicable. 
B. If a claim is made or suit is brought against a 
covered entity or any of its "employees" eligible for 
defense or indemnification pursuant to the Govern-
mental Immunity Act, the covered entity shall imme-
diately forward to the Fund, or its designated agent, 
every demand, notice, summons or other process, or 
request for defense or indemnification received by it 
or its representative. 
C. A covered entity shall cooperate with the Fund 
and, upon the Fund's request, assist in making settle-
ments, in the conduct of suits and in enforcing any 
right of contribution or indemnity against any person 
or organization who may be liable to the covered en-
tity because of any event with respect to which cover-
age is provided by the Fund, and a covered entity 
shall attend hearings and trials and assist in serving 
and giving evidence and obtaining the attendance of 
witnesses. A covered entity shall not, except at its 
own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obligation or incur any expense other than for first 
aid to others at the time of an accident. 
D. A covered entity shall not waive for any "em-
ployee" any duties, such as request for indemnifica-
tion and cooperation in defense, required by the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act in order for the "employee" 
to qualify for defense and indemnification from the 
covered entity. 
E. Failure by a covered entity to comply with any of 
the provisions of this rule shall be sufficient grounds 
for the Fund to deny coverage for a claim associated 
with such failure to comply. 
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Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD BRITTAIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY aka JOB SERVICE, and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through UTAH DIVISION OF 
FACILITIES, CONSTRUCTION AND 
MANAGEMENT, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Utah ) 
BRENT D. YOUNG, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. On or about the 4th day of February, 1991, Mr. 
Brittain was injured when he fell down the steps at Job Service. 
2. Mr. Brittain contacted this office on or about the 
11th day of February, 1991. 
3. My understanding was that he had contacted individuals 
at Job Service and that they had reported the claim to State 
Jim 30 ilnfiTSZ 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT 
D. YOUNG 
Civil No. 910400628 
Risk Management. 
4. My memory is that the state Risk Management contacted 
me sometime in mid-February. On February 27, 1991 I mailed a 
letter to the Risk Manager informing them I had photographs of 
the steps at Job Service taken shortly after the time of the 
incident in question. A copy of the letter is attached hereto. 
5. The office of State Risk Management through their 
agent, one James Christensen, contacted this office by 
telephone. He informed me that he wanted to come and visit 
with me. I met with him on or about March 12, 1991, and 
confirmed that meeting with him by letter dated April 12, 
1991. A copy of the letter is attached hereto. 
6. Mr. Christensen also confirmed the March 12, 1991 
meeting by letter dated April 11, 1991. A copy of the letter 
is attached hereto. 
7. State Risk Management was served personally a notice 
of claim, as was the Attorney General, on 11 March, 1991, the 
day before my meeting with Mr. Christensen. 
8. Mr. Christensen had previously represented himself to 
me by telephone to be an employee of Blume Associates, which 
was an adjusting and investigating company. He later confirmed 
at our meeting, and by his letter to me dated April 24, 1991, 
what he indicated in our first telephone contact — that he was 
an agent acting for his principal, Job Service and State 
2 
s u i ^ t e n s e r -'- " l e t t e r s d a t e d *'• m~, 199" 
2 2 , 1 9 9 1 , August « 1 9 9 1 , an." Auq. ** H) t i n u a l l y 
/ . iqi I i llii i " i 11 J in ncipfj J nl1 II i" 
Service and State Risk Management '"opies of these letters are 
attached hereto. 
10. , tj- *wi, 
Christense: ••• iderstanding a1 * '**l\*-i •-.-•.• * • 
Divisior * - Management, ' r ^ •+- gent m . 
< . department nf 
Employment Security aka Job Service in handling fh> 
above-described c-ai »*• - th^ref «r« t h I-, the Div;. r.: - r 
M d i i a g e n n e i i l \ - \,\\\ \ \ihom a no4 .. * v 
was r e q u i r e d * :• f i l e d p u r s u a n t j J,( , A, S e c t i o n 63-30-I*. 
1 My i i n d e r s t a n d i n g and b e l i e f th . i t MT . C h r i s t e n s e n ; 
ai i a; •- • ni ' i i i in m mh f iprv ico and t h e 
Division Management, and that Risk Management was 
representing the Department of Employmenl Security IRB job 
S e r v i d r r-i *• J eaf f 1 I IIM-<1 li, \\\ nieehni | w i lh Mi i h r i s t e n s e n on 
o r a b o u t March 12 1991 , and by l e t t e r s 1 i urn him d a t e d May 1 7, 
1 9 9 1 , May 2 2 , 1 9 9 1 , August: 9, 1991, HIKI Augus t 111 1991 
1 2 . I rv 1 IMT iMini'i'l ! v " H I IIKJ Mn1 'I i. i" 'it c l a i m on 
b e h a l f ui my c l i e n t , t l ie i n j u r y o c c u r r i n g on F e b r u a r y 
and t h e n o t i c e s b e i n g s e r v e d oi I MajLCi* xx, x^^x . 
3 
1:1. Despite vigors • - pursuit of this -'3 - ^ r a: ^  Lu 
t I'm i s> a t * ' -3 
insufficient . ..sdirecteu, untu tn^ ! . unq : defendant's 
present motion, a though discussions t ^itlemp^t -* * +f :al 
pr eparr 
throughout the ten and one \u-\iz months ; which detects ~ne 
notices might have been mred and iT <• ths * *v-."i 
Dated and signed this L; day of o'' V : *-_. 
I 
SubsriMl':,^ ? ; Jl -/.": t-!-/.' ;,v JfiS • a\ c: Lc?^^J 
1992. 
Notary iPublic "" 7" ' *'' *"" '* . 
t — - { , : . . • • . . . 
4 
February 27, 1951 4033 
Risk Manager, State of nt.-ih 
355 \l. North Tempif 
3 Triad Centerf Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Dear r .: : 
Pleas- :r _:_;:„,. u.^c JL u:::L-:.M*:it Harold Brittain. V.r. 
Britta;r was injured vhen he? v?as traversing the steps locat--
at Job Service ir Prove ?ul^ epr rebate the opportunity to 
discuss this matter with you briofl^/. * ntv ht that this can 
be resolved short of litigation. I ! c?v-- :.n my possession 
photographs of the steps i-\ ,;r about t >-=*• tire the incident 
occurred which yo-t : v r < >elpfu" •• . .u^tii.g '-cur r,: , 
Sincerely, 
pppj"-; D. YOUPG 
A I -1 1 "' I /'" I • I 4 U J J 
ATTN: Jim Christensen 
Bloom & Associate, inr. 
P.O. Box 21572 
1888 East Fe:t U :, v. flvj, 
Salt T,ak<- - - ^ 2 3 
Pc L .: ^ 1 * Brittain 
Dear ! 
We met a few weeks ago in my *»ffu- :.fornec y^« UL hat 
time that I had taken a statement from Michael R. Hawkins, I 
enclose of copy of Mr. Hawkins1 statement and suggest that in 
the next month or so that you and I have a talk and see if this 
case can be resolved. 
Sincerely, 
BRENT u. vr"T <J 
BDYrmr 
Enc. 
r>isc/corr/c9 
u 
B&A BLOOM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
small independent • all lit ies 
adjusting • ii ivestigating • appraising 
BRADLEY B B L O O M 
JIM CHRISTENSEN 
GARY D TOOMB 
LAVAR D SKOJ5EN 
1866 E FORT UNON BLVD 
P O BOX 21572 
SALT LAKE OTY UTAh 64121 
PHONE (801)942-5280 
FAX (801 .942-6719 
A p r i l I  I , JILi Ml 
REIVED 
A?* 
Brent D. "Young 
Ivie and Young 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 8 
Re: Your Client: 
Loss Date: 
Our Principal: 
Our Fi 1 e No: 
'vis £ You* ;•* 
Harold Brittain 
2/04/91 
Job Service 'St nl i n,, *\\ Mdnagenie t 
12514 
Dear Mr. Young: 
Attached are some medical Dining 
and that were sent directly to me. 
Since you are represent J in i in 
billings directly to you. 
I n M l in i I ii mm 
•nl has received 
orwarding these 
This letter also follows up our meeting of 3/12/91 in which we 
briefly discussed your clientfs case. At that time you were 
going to be forwarding me a copy of the statement you took from 
the witness and further medical reports, etc., on your client's 
condition. 
ns, 
At |our earliest opportunity would you please forward them to me, 
YOIAX^ vepy^ truly,; 
qt-5^ 
B&A BLOOM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
small independent • all lines 
adjusting • investigating • appraising 
BRADLEY B B i O O M 
JIMCHRlSTENSEN 
GAPY D TOOMB 
LAVA9 D $ K ' O U S E \ 
1888 E POPT UNON B.VD 
P O BOX 21572 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 64<21 
PHONE (801)942-5280 
FAX fSQl'- 9-2-6? I 9 
Apri 
Mr. jsrent i>. Young 
Ivie and Young 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
MPR ? t 
'
 l
' * a 
*oung 
Re: Your Cl ient : Harold Br i t ta : -
Loss Date: 2 /4 /91 
Our P r i n c i p l e : Job S e r v i c e / S t a t e Kisf Manniqprneint 
Our F i l e No, 
Dear Mr. Young: 
A t t a c h e d ^s a meciicai billing I have received from Utah Valley 
Radiology in the amount of $110.00, for your el ient, Haroir? P 
Brittain. 
1 am forwarding these L* 
representing Mr. Brittain, 
I have also received the infc 
to me and do appreciate that. 
von axe "ow 
*ve recently sent 
it any further medical reports come, etc or are received, would 
you please forward them to me for further evaluation of this 
case. 
^^a^Cs Ch 
Senior A<kj 
JC:ae 
Att: 
Y>3>3> 
B&A BLOOM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
small independent • 
adjusting • investigating 
all lines 
• appraising 
May 17 , 1991 
Mr. Brent D. Young 
Ivie and Young 
P 0 Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
RE: Your client: 
Loss Date: 
Our Principal: 
Our File No: 
B&ADLEV B BLOOM 
JIM CHPiSTENSEN 
GAPN D TOOMB 
LAVAP D S*OUSEN! 
1888 E FOPT UNION BlVD 
PO BOX 21572 
SALT LAKE CUV UTAH 84121 
PHONE (8011942 5280 
PAX ,801 942 67]9 
RECEIVED 
MAY 2 0 1991 
Jvie & Young 
Harold Britain 
2-4-91 
Job Service/State Risk Management 
12514 
Dear Mr. Young: 
This letter is to follow up our phone conversation of 4-2 6-91 in 
which you advised that your client should be finished treating 
around the middle of May or thereabouts. 
When your client is through treating, would you please forward 
copies of updated medical reports, etc. so that we can further 
evaluate this case. 
>s Chrd 
S e n i o r A d j u s t e r 
JC;db 
it>^ 
U 
B&A BLOOM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
small independent • all lines 
adjusting • investigating • appraising 
W or<>iSTfc\SEN 
GAPt r lOOMB 
1868 E K-P' uNtQN BU'D 
PO BCX 21672 
SALT
 wAkf C'Tv uTAH 8412^ 
P M - ^ P 6C4,v42 528C 
May 2 2 , 1991 
WECBVED 
|AM 2 a \*b\ 
Brent D. Young 
Ivie and Young 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
RE: Your Client: 
Loss Date: 
Our Principal: 
Our File No: 
Dear Mr. Young: 
Harold Brittain 
2-4-91 
Job Service/State Risk Management 
12514 
Attached are some copies of billings that I have received 
regarding your client's case. I am forwarding these billings to 
you so you will have a complete set. 
Y^ trrs very 
B&A BLOOM & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
small independent • all lines 
adjusting • investigating • appraising 
August 9 , 1991 
Brent D. Young 
Ivie & Young 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
RE: Your Client: 
Loss Date: 
Our Principal: 
Our File NO: 
Dear Mr. Young: 
BRADLEY B BLOOM 
JIM CHPlSTENSEN 
GAPN D TOOMB 
L A V A P D S K O J S E N 
1866 E FOPT UNION BLVD 
P O BOX 21572 
SALT LAKE C'TY UTAH 84121 
P H O N E (80<) 942 5280 
FA> (831 942 6719 
RECEIVED 
AUG 1 3 1991 
tv*& Young 
Harold Britain 
2-4-91 
Job Service/State Risk Management 
12514 
This letter is to follow up our telephone conversation of 8-7-91. 
Attached are some billings that I have received from Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center that I am forwarding directly to you for 
your further handling. 
You advised that your client had a herniated disk and that he had 
approximately $7,000 in medical billings at this time. You were 
going to put together a package of all the medical billings, 
documentation, etc. as well as your demand so that I can present 
this to the Office of State Risk Management to see if I will 
still be handling this file or if they will handle it directly 
with you. 
irs yery 
James Chfc^L&teiis^n 
S e n i o r A d j u s t e r 
JC:db 
B&A 
b o 0 4 1991 
lviw& Young 
BLOOM & ASSOCIATES, INC 
small independent • all lines 
adjusting • investigating • appraising 
BRADLEY B BLOOM 
JIM CHRISTENSEN 
GARY D TOOMB 
LAVAR D SKOUSEN 
1888 E FORT UNION BLVD 
PO BOX 21572 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84121 
PHONE (801)942-5280 
PAX (801)942-6719 
August 3 0, 1991 
Brent D. Young 
Ivie and Young 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
RE: Your Client: 
Loss Date: 
Our Principal: 
Our File No: 
Dear Mr. Young: 
Harold Brittain 
2-4-91 
Job Service/State Risk Management 
12514 
This is to acknowledge and thank you for the settlement brochure 
on your client, Harold Brittain, regarding the above captioned 
accident. As I have advised you on the telephone, this case is 
now over my contract authority with the State of Utah and so I am 
forwarding the file to the Office of State Risk Management, 355 
West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84180 for their further handling and assignment to one of 
their on-staff adjusters. They should be making contact with you 
in the very near future. 
I do appreciate the assistance and the opportunity of working 
with you on this case. 
truly, 
JC:db 
